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INTRODUCTION
The liquidity problems faced by many financial institutions during the recent global financial crisis (GFC), even those with adequate capital levels, highlight the significance of liquidity in the proper functioning of the banking sector and financial markets. Responding to the crisis, the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS) initiated the Basel III standards to strengthen 2 the regulatory framework, which will enhance the stability of the financial sector. As well as improving the capital adequacy standards, Basel III has introduced additional controls related to leverage and liquidity. Whereas the former is intended to limit the leveraging in banks, the liquidity requirements are expected to promote a regime that will help financial institutions withstand liquidity shocks. In a cross-country study, BCBS shows that the impact of higher capital and liquidity ratios will produce net benefits by significantly reducing the likelihood of crises and the accompanying GDP losses. 1 Similarly, Yan, Hall and Turner show the positive impact of Basel III standards in terms of greater stability and lower GDP losses for the UK economy. 2 The new Basel III standards will also require changes in governance, business models and processes in banks. 3 Although Islamic banking has been growing rapidly and has become a significant part of the financial sector in many countries, it came to attention during the GFC as it appeared to be withstanding the downturn much better than its conventional counterpart. 4 Hasan and Dridi
show that, during the years immediately after the crisis, Islamic banks were more resilient and their credit and asset growth were relatively higher compared to conventional banks. 5 As a result, Islamic banks were assessed more favourably by rating agencies in the post-crisis era. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Merrouche studied the status of Islamic and conventional banks for the period prior to the crisis (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) and found that Islamic banks had higher capitalization and liquidity reserves relative to conventional banks. 6 Similar results were found by Parashar and Venkatesh, who confirmed that liquidity in Islamic banks was higher during both pre-and postcrisis years. 7 Better capitalization and liquidity are among the possible reasons for the better performance of Islamic banks during the crisis.
Higher liquidity in Islamic banks, however, is also indicative of the constraints faced by Islamic banks in terms of lack of liquidity management instruments and markets arising from adherence to Shari'ah principles. Due to Shari'ah restrictions on interest-bearing transactions, Islamic banks cannot hold liquid debt securities such as government bonds and are also unable to tap into interest-based money markets to obtain cash in case of need. Due to these restrictions, devising infrastructure and instruments to manage liquidity risks is considered a key challenge to the sound development of the Islamic banking sector. 8 
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While there is a growing body of literature on the implications of Basel III standards for conventional banks, studies on their implications for the Islamic banking sector are scant. In response to the crisis, the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), an international standardsetting body for Islamic financial institutions, published guidelines on liquidity risk management in March 2012. 9 The document, however, does not cover issues related to application of the liquidity ratios identified in Basel III for Islamic banks. This paper explores the issues and challenges of implementing the Basel III liquidity requirements for Islamic banks. To do so, the paper firstly introduces the basic Shari'ah principles and products used by Islamic banks on both the liabilities and assets sides; it then presents the regulatory environments under which these banks operate. After outlining the key features of the Basel III liquidity requirements, the problems likely to be encountered by Islamic banks in meeting these requirements are analysed.
ISLAMIC CONTRACTS, BANKING MODEL AND SECURITIES
The underlying principle of Islamic law related to economics and commerce is permissibility (ibahah), which maintains that everything in economic affairs is permitted except those explicitly forbidden by divine guidance. 10 Prohibitions under Islamic law can be broadly classified as riba and gharar. Riba (literally meaning increase or growth) is prohibited by
Shari'ah (Islamic law). Although it is common to associate riba with interest, it has much wider implications and can take different forms. The common premise in the prohibition of riba lies in the unequal trade of values in exchange. 11 One of the implications of riba is that debt cannot be sold at a discount and can be transferred at its par value only.
While gharar literally means 'danger' and also signifies deception, the word has connotations of excessive uncertainty and contractual ambiguity in transactions. 12 Gharar can exist in the terms of a contract or in the object of a contract. Gharar in a contract arises when the consequences of a transaction are not clear and there is uncertainty about whether a transaction will take place.
Gharar in the object of the contract arises when there is uncertainty about the subject matter of the sale and its delivery. Islamic law distinguishes between ownership and possession and requires actual possession before selling something to ensure delivery. 13 Gharar is present when either the object of sale does not exist or the seller and/or buyer has no knowledge of the object being exchanged. In a salam contract, the buyer of a product pays in advance for a good that is produced and delivered later. The contract applies mainly to agricultural commodities. e) Istisna: An Istisna contract is similar to the salam contract with the difference that in istisna the good is produced according to the specifications given by the buyer. This applies mainly to manufactured goods and real estate. Furthermore, in istisna the payments can be made in instalments over time with the progression of the production.
Islamic Banking: Contracts and Model
Note that, in the case of a firm, istisna can be used in a couple of ways. First, the firm can obtain funds to finance its working capital needs. This istisna contract is a debt contract that can be used only if the financier is willing to purchase the goods at the stipulated time of delivery. The second approach would be for the firm to ask the financier to provide a built asset (such as real estate) and to make the payments over a period of time in the future. In this case, the financier may need to have a parallel istisna and subcontract the project to a third party for its completion. The dominant model of Islamic banking is the one-tier mudarabah with multiple financing tools.
On the liability side of Islamic banks, demand deposits take the form of qard hasan (interest-free loans) that are returned fully on demand. Savings and investment deposits use mudarabah contracts and take the form of profit-sharing investment accounts (PSIA). Using the profitsharing principle to reward depositors is a unique feature of Islamic banks. The returns on PSIA are contingent on return on assets, implying that neither the principal nor a return is guaranteed. 16 
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On the asset side, Islamic banks use murabahah (cost-plus or mark-up sale), istisna/salam (prepaid sale) and ijarah (leasing), and profit-sharing modes of financing (musharakah and mudarabah). Although, in theory, all these instruments can be used on the assets side, in practice most Islamic banks predominantly use debt-based (murabahah) and leasing (ijarah) contracts. In some cases, Islamic banks also use tawarruq, a controversial transaction that replicates an interest-based loan. This mode, however, is prohibited by the Islamic Fiqh Academy, a global
Islamic jurisprudential body, on the grounds that it involves riba.
17 Table 1 shows the diversity of banking practices on the asset side in different countries. In all countries, except Sudan, the equity-based modes constitute a small percentage of the total financing. 18 The 
Islamic Securities: Sukuk
The Islamic alternatives to interest-based bonds are sukuk. The Accounting and Auditing
Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIF) defines sukuk as "certificates of equal value representing, after closing subscription, receipt of the values of certificates and putting it to use as planned, common title to shares and rights in tangible assets, usufructs and services, or equity of a given project or equity of a special investment activity". 22 AAOIFI identifies various types of sukuks that can be classified based on assets, debt, equity, and services. Asset-based 7 securities include ijarah sukuks, which are certificates issued against a tangible, leased asset, and/or promise of lease in the future.
Debt-based sukuks arise from transactions that create debt. Murabahah sukuks are used to raise funds from investors in order to purchase goods or assets that are sold at a mark-up to the originator. The price of the goods is repaid to the sukuk holders at a later date either in instalments or as a one-off payment. Holders of istisna sukuks provide funds that are used in the construction of real estate, and investors become the owners of the real estate upon completion.
Equity-based sukuks arise when funds raised are used in profit/output-sharing contracts. The holders of mudarabah sukuks participate in a project in which the issuer acts as a manager and the returns are shared on a profit/loss basis. 23 Musharakah sukuk holders invest in and manage the project and share the profit according to a pre-agreed ratio. Under the agency-based wakala sukuk, the holders of the certificates provide funds that are managed by an investment agency in some income-generating activity. The manager or agent is paid a certain fee for the services provided.
Holders of sukuks are the owners of the rights and bear the risks that these instruments represent.
Depending on the contractual basis used, sukuks can have fixed or variable returns and may be tradable. Securities can be traded at negotiable prices if these represent equity, real physical assets or usufruct. 24 However, sukuks representing debt or money are not negotiable and can be exchanged at par value only.
While sukuk is a relatively new phenomenon that began in the early 2000s, it has grown rapidly in a short period of time. Although the sukuk issuance decreased significantly after the global financial crisis, the sector has rebounded in recent years. IFSB reports that, with an average growth rate of 60.1% during the period 2009-2012, the total outstanding sukuk stood at USD 229.3 billion by the end of 2012. 25 During 2012, sukuk was predominantly issued by sovereign issuers, of which the central bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia) dominated the market, contributing to 43.7% of all issuances (amounting to USD 57.3 billion). The share of the primary market issues in the GCC region, which is the other major market, was 18% of the total issues, with the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia being among the larger issuers.
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ISLAMIC BANKING AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY STANDARDS
The Shari'ah compliant contracts used by Islamic banks change the risk-return features of products on both the assets and liabilities sides and have regulatory implications. 26 While some of the regulatory standards of BCBS can be applied to Islamic banks, Shari'ah compliant contracts introduce certain unique features that are not dealt with in international regulatory standards. 27 For example, the use of profit-sharing investment accounts (PSIA) on the liability side raises several regulatory issues. One key concern related to PSIA is whether to consider them as deposits or treat them as capital, as they share the risks of the assets. 28 Furthermore, as the returns on PSIA are based on the profit/loss-sharing principle there is a need to protect the rights of depositors/investors. The fiduciary nature of the contract would also require more disclosure of banking operations to the depositors/investors. 
LIQUIDITY RISKS AND BASEL III LIQUIDITY REQUIREMENTS
Liquidity is the 'ability of a bank to fund increases in assets and meet obligations as they come due, without incurring unacceptable losses'. 38 The sources of liquidity beyond normal banking practices can be distinguished into three types: 'funding' liquidity can be sought by obtaining credit from other financial institutions; 'market' liquidity can be obtained by selling assets in financial markets; and 'central bank liquidity' in the form of credit can be obtained from the Central Bank by providing acceptable collateral. Liquidity risk may result from difficulties in obtaining cash at reasonable cost either from borrowings (funding liquidity risk) or from sale of assets (market liquidity risk). 39 To meet liquidity needs from private sources, a bank must hold assets that can be sold or used as collateral to obtain credit from other financial intermediaries. 40 However, market failures may constrain access to liquidity from private sources. Opaque bank assets create information-related problems whereby financial institutions may be unable to screen and monitor the prospective borrowers adequately. 41 The failure of markets to provide liquidity can be resolved in two ways. First, private arrangements can be used between banks to create liquidity pools that can be used in case of need. However, this is difficult to implement, particularly when the financial sector experiences economy-wide negative shocks. In such cases, public bodies such as the central bank must provide the liquidity to prevent serious interruptions to operations, which can lead to bank failures. One of the tools used by central banks is the provision of emergency funding to banks as the lender of last resort (LOLR).
While BCBS had published guidelines related to liquidity risk management prior to the GFC, the central role of liquidity in exacerbating the crisis led to the inclusion of specific liquidity requirements in Basel III. 42 The objective of introducing the regulatory liquidity requirements along with the capital requirements is to promote a more resilient banking sector by improving its ability to withstand shocks from different sources. 43 Specifically, Basel III introduced the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) to cater for the short-term liquidity needs and risks and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) to ensure adequate liquid funds in the medium/long term. The essential features of these ratios are discussed next.
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Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)
The regulatory requirement for the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR), which banks would be required to report at least monthly, is defined as:
where HQLA is the stock of high-quality liquid assets and TNCO is the total net cash outflows defined as the liquidity outflows less the inflows over a 30-day stress period. Liquidity outflows include, among others, specific percentages of deposits (5% of retail deposits that are covered by deposit insurance schemes, 10% for those not covered) and various liabilities that become due during the next 30 days. Similarly, liquidity inflows include contractual inflows that the bank is certain to receive over the next 30 days. Note that the inflows are limited to 75% of the liquidity outflows.
BCBS considers HQLA as those that 'can be easily and immediately converted into cash at little or no loss of value'. 45 The fundamental characteristics of HQLA include low risk, ease and certainty of valuation, low correlation with other risk assets, and being listed on a developed and recognized exchange market. 46 The market-related characteristics of HQLA include assets traded in active and sizable markets, low volatility, and features of flight-to-quality assets whereby their demand increases in systemic crises.
HQLA is segregated into Level 1 and Level 2 assets.  Corporate debt securities, commercial papers and covered bonds that satisfy the following: they should have a long-term credit rating of at least AA-; however, in the absence of a long-term rating, they should have a short-term rating that is qualitatively equivalent to a long-term rating; in the absence of a rating, they should be internally rated as having a probability of default equivalent to a credit rating of at least AA-.
Level 2B assets can be included as HQLA at the discretion of the regulators. Different haircuts are applied to different types of Level 2B assets. Some examples of haircuts applied are as follows:
 Residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) can be included provided a haircut of 25% is applied and the following conditions are met: they are not issued by the bank itself or its affiliates; they have a long-term credit rating of AA or higher; in the absence of a long-term rating, they should have a short-term rating that is qualitatively equivalent to a long-term rating.
 Corporate debt securities including commercial papers are included provided a haircut of 50% is applied and the following conditions are met: not issued by the bank itself or its affiliates; having a long-term credit rating between A+ and BBB-; in the absence of a long-term rating, having a short-term rating that is qualitatively equivalent to a long-term rating.
 Common equity shares can be included in Level 2B assets provided a haircut of 50% is applied and the following condition is met: not issued by the bank itself or its affiliates.
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Basel III stipulates a cap at 40% of the Level 2 assets and 15% of Level 2B assets of the total HQLA.
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Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR)
Whereas the objective of LCR is to ensure that banks have enough liquidity in the short term (three months), the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) is intended to promote medium-and longterm resilience against shocks. NSFR focuses on ensuring that banks have on-going stable funding sources on the liability side to fund long-term assets over a year. NSFR, which should be reported to the supervisors at least quarterly, is defined as follows:
where ASF is the available amount of stable funding relating to the sources of funds and RSF is the required amount of stable funding linked to the uses of funds. 51 Stable funding sources comprise capital, preference shares and liabilities with maturities of more than one year, deposits, and wholesale funding with maturities of less than a year but expected to remain with the bank over long stress periods. To arrive at the ASF, the items in the stable funding are multiplied by ASF factors ranging from 0% to 100% depending on their maturity and other characteristics. For example, capital, preferred stocks, and liabilities with maturity of more than one year have a 100% ASF factor, while unsecured wholesale funding and non-maturity demand and term deposits of less than one year carry an ASF factor weight of 50%.
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While the ASF relates to the capital/liability side of the balance sheet, the RSF is linked to the liquidity characteristics of the assets and off-balance sheet items and activities (BCBS 2010a).
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Similar to ASF, RSF is calculated by multiplying different assets and off-balance liabilities by appropriate RSF factors ranging from 0% to 100%. A higher RSF factor indicates that an asset cannot be monetized easily either through sale or by using it as collateral to obtain external funding, and it would therefore require a more stable funding source. For example, cash, unencumbered short-term unsecured instruments, transactions, securities, and loans with less than one year of maturities carry a weight of 0%, while unencumbered gold, equity securities and corporate or covered bonds that fulfil certain requirements (including rating A+ to A-) have an RSF factor of 50%.
14 To meet the liquidity ratios, banks can switch to higher-quality assets, shorten the maturity of assets, increase the length of their liabilities and raise more capital. 54 Recognizing that some jurisdictions may have insufficient Level 1 and Level 2 assets to meet the LCR requirements, BCBS provides the following three options as alternatives. 2012 shows that only six had Shari'ah-compliant LOLR facilities. 59 The study also revealed that, of the countries surveyed, only two had discount windows facilities that met Shari'ah requirements and only five countries had Shari'ah-compliant deposit services for Islamic banks.
Indonesia is one of the few countries in which Islamic banks can obtain short-term funds from the central bank via the LOLR scheme. Based on mudarabah, the scheme provides financing from 14 to 90 days against collateral such as sovereign bonds and sukuk. 60 The return paid on the funds is tied to the deposit rate that the bank pays to other clients.
Islamic Banks and Basel III Liquidity Ratios
The dearth of available instruments due to Shari'ah principles in most jurisdictions will restrict Islamic banks to holding liquid assets identified in the LCR. 61 As Similarly, Islamic banks will also face problems in meeting the Basel III NSFR requirement. For example, Islamic banks cannot hold preference shares, a source of liquidity with 100% ASF factor, as these are considered to be non-Shari'ah-compliant. The bulk of the assets in NSFR that have low RSF factors are marketable securities and bonds, particularly those issued by sovereigns and public bodies. However, due to the lack of Shari'ah-compliant securities that fulfil these criteria in most jurisdictions, Islamic banks will not be able to hold assets carrying relatively higher RSF factors.
As mentioned above, Basel III provides three options for countries that do not have sufficient Without an adequate supply of liquid Shari'ah-compliant instruments and active markets in which to trade them, it will be difficult for Islamic banks to meet the Basel III liquidity requirements. The implication of having fewer assets that can be treated as liquid for both LCR and NSFR is that Islamic banks will have to hold more cash and reserves. In the absence of highquality assets, banks may have to shorten the maturity of assets, increase the length of their liabilities and raise more capital to meet the liquidity requirements. 66 This may put Islamic banks in a disadvantageous position compared to their conventional counterparts and create obstacles to the long-term growth of the industry. To resolve their liquidity needs, Islamic banks may require additional innovative measures and initiatives.
A novel arrangement for managing liquidity at the private level has been initiated by the Central Bank of Sudan which encourages banks to create 'alliance groups' to fulfil certain objectives including managing liquidity. 67 This plan takes the form of creating liquidity pools that can be used in case of need among the participating banks. However, in the event of economy-wide shocks, the scheme may not be able to meet the needs of all the participating banks and will require a response at the level of governmental bodies. Given the lack of active sukuk markets, one option is for a central bank to act as 'market maker of last resort' (MMLR). 68 In its role as MMLR, the central bank would buy the illiquid sukuk at discounted prices, thereby providing liquidity to banks when needed.
CONCLUSION
Although the Islamic financial industry is one of the fastest-growing sectors in many countries, it lacks liquidity instruments and infrastructure, which may hamper its future growth. In many jurisdictions in which Islamic banks operate, there are no inter-Islamic banks or organized money markets from which funds might be sought in times of need. Furthermore, due to the lack of liquid sukuk and active sukuk markets, Islamic banks face significant market liquidity risks.
While, in some countries, central banks are playing an important role in providing tradable instruments to meet the short-term liquidity needs of Islamic banks, the scarcity of Shari'ahcompliant liquid assets is still a serious problem, forcing many Islamic banks to hold more cash.
Moving forward, liquidity management is one of the most challenging tasks facing Islamic financial institutions. Islamic banks will face constraints in attempting to fulfil the Basel III liquidity requirements if the liquidity instruments and infrastructure are not developed. A robust liquidity infrastructure for the Islamic financial sector will be required, not only for the smooth functioning of Islamic banks but also to fulfil the regulatory liquidity requirements of Basel III.
A sound liquidity infrastructure for the Islamic financial sector would include the development of private sources of liquidity (such as an Islamic money market and a vibrant securities market) and supportive public safety-net facilities such as LLOR facilities. Given the restrictions arising from Shari'ah principles, there may also be a need for innovative initiatives to resolve the liquidity management requirements at both the private and public levels.
